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Recent Experience  with Commercial  Debt Reduction
INTRODUCTION
Over  the  years,  many  proposals  have  been  made  to resolve  the commercial  debt  problems
of middle-income  developing  countries  (see Carmichael  (1989)  for an overview). During  a
period  of time,  international  policy  makers  considered  market-based  debt  reduction  an attractive
means to solve the debt problem.  Market-based  debt reduction  transactions  involve the
repurchase  (or conversion  into  other claims)  by the debtor  of its commercial  debt at a discount
through  an open-market  operation. Market-based  debt  reduction  transactions  increased  sharply
after 1985,  from about $1 billion  in face  value  of debt retired  to over $17 billion  in 1988  (see
the Quarterly  Review,  World  Bank,  various  issues). The results  were mixed,  however,  as debt
burdens  remained  high  and economic  performance  in many  of the indebted  countries  remained
poor.
Over this period, many  proposals  involving  government  intervention  were made, often
centered  around  an institution  involved  in buying  up commercial  debt  at a discount  and forgiving
part of it.  Most  of these  proposals  involved  a concerted  approach  to debt reduction,  i.e., all
creditors  would  have to sell their claims  to the institution  or be forced  to participate  in debt
forgiveness  in a uniform  way. None  of these  concerted  proposals  were implemented  to solve
the commercial  debt problems.
What  did occur was official  support  for a menu-based  approach. In 1989,  officials  of
several  creditor  countries-former  Finance  Minister  Miyazawa  of Japan,  President  Mitterand  of
France,  and Secretary  Brady  of the United  States--proposed  to promote  official  support  for  debt
and debt  reduction  (DDSR). The Brady  plan  finally  adopted  in May  of 1989  involves  the  IMF,4
the World  Bank, and the Japanese  government  providing  between  $30-35  billion  in funds to
support  DDSR  operations  agreed  by debtor  countries  with  their  commercial  creditors. Since  the
introduction  of the Brady  Plan,  five  countries  (Mexico,  Philippines,  Costa  Rica,  Venezuela,  and
Uruguay)  have  received  official  support  and reached  agreements  with  their  commercial  creditors
on  DDSR packages reducing commercial  debt obligations  and/or converting debts into
collateralized  bonds  and/or domestic  assets. At the time of writing, the Philippines  (second
phase), Brazil, Argentina,  Poland, and Ecuador, among others, are negotiating  with their
creditors  agreements  along similar  lines. 2
The  two  key features  in these  agreements  are the  participation  of virtually  all commercial
banks 3 and the use of a menu of different  options,  including  both debt reduction  and new
money, from which  banks have to choose.  This differs from previous,  market-based  debt
reduction  transactions  in that, like in a concerted  operation,  aU  banks  need to agree to some
form  of restructuring  for the agreement  to be concluded. By  contrast  to a concerted  approach,
however,  this menu-based  approach  allows  banks  to freely  choose  among  the menu  of options,
and therefore  does  not impose  the same  treatment  to all banks.
The main  purpose  of this paper is to evaluate  the financial  implications  of these three
approaches,  namely  market-based,  concerted,  and menu-based,  from the point of view of the
debtor  and the creditors. After  a background  discussion  on the development  impact  of DDSR
operations  and their benefits  to aU  parties,  conducted  in section  I, we focus  on the evaluation
of the three approaches. In section  II, we discuss  the analytical  case for market-based  debt
2Nigeria  concluded  an agreement  in Febniary  1992. About  twenty  countries  wers initially  singled  out as
potential  recipients  of Brady  treatment
3A  partal exception  is the  Philippines  opemtion,  where  about  one fourth  of eligible  commercial  bank  debt  was
not involved  in the restnturing.S
reduction  and concerted  debt rducdon, explain  how  dhe  new  menubad  approach  to debt
reduction  woiks,  and  discuss  tie reasons  why  it may  domnte te  odhe two  methods  of debt
reduction.  In section  m, we  nevw  the five recent Brady  deals and evaluate  our dieoretdcal
analysis  regarding  the workdngs  of the menu-bod appoch  apins  acta  picce.  Finally,
in section  IV, we  conclude  by dfawing  lsons  from he  deas.6
I.  EFCIENCY  GAI  AND BENEFTS DF DDSR
The main moti'  ation for DDSR  is the creation  of efficiency  gains by unlocking  the
inefficient  arrangement  in which  some  indebted  countries  and  commercial  banks  are trapped  into.
At the root of this inefficient  arrangement  is the lack  of enforceability  of sovereign  contracts,
which  limits  the  countries'  ability  to credibly  commit  to future  payments  and, consequently,  their
ability  to attract  foreign  financing  beyond  a relatively  low  ceiling. Once  circumstances  are such
that  this ceiling  is surpassed,  a debt crisis  sets  in and commercial  banks  retrench,  lending  only
on a negotiated,  involuntary  basis. While  in these  circumstances  both  banks  and countries  have
a common  interest  in efficient  domestic  investment  helped  by  adequate  external  financing,  whose
returns  they could share  in a mutually  advantageous  way, the implementation  of a cooperative
arrangement  between  creditors  and debtors would require commercial  banks to limit their
retrenchment  facilitating  the countries'  investment  effort.  In practice, coordination  failures
among  banks  and the relative  inability  to credibly  commit  to cooperate  in the future  of all the
parties  involved  have  precluded  the implementation  of such  cooperative  arrangements.  Instead,
short-sighted  debt  rescheduling  negotiations  have  taken  place  resulting  in inefficient  outcomes.
The inefficient  arrangement  that DDSR attempts to improve is  characterized  by
disincentives  to domestic  investment  and the lack of external  financing,  which result in low
domestic investment. Efficiency  gains from DDSR relate to more and better domestic
investment  as well as more efficient  external  financing,  both in terms of volumes  and risk-
sharing  features. DDSR  can  lead  to a new  structure  of commercial  bank debt  whose  face  value
is reduced  and mostly  converted  into  bonds,  where  permanent  and  relatively  low  ceilings  on debt7
service are established, and where some insurance is provided in th; form of fixed nominal
interest rates and recapture clauses.
Efficiency Gains ofDDSR
DDSR operations are carried out in the expectation that these characteristics  generate
efficiency gains.  These efficiency gains of  DDSR can be  classified in  three  (partially
overlapping)  categories: (i) those related to the cashflow  implications  of the DDSR agreement,
the direct benefits; (ii) those reiated to changes  in the debtor's economy following  DDSR, the
domestic indirect benefits; and  (iii) those related to  changes in  the  behavior of  creditors
following  DDSR, the external indirect benefits.
Ci)  Cashflow  implications  of the DDSR  agreement:  direct  benefits
The financing of the DDSR operation matters.  To the extent that the debtor country is
capital-rationed,  investment  is inefficiently  low and cashflow  relief can have a positive effect on
domestic  investment. However, DDSR tend operations  expected to be front-loaded  because the
debtor country has no credible way to commit to future compensation  in exchange for upfront
debt reduction. The financing  of this upfront liquidity need is thus important. When financing
comes from domestic sources or from external grants and loans that the debtor would have
received anyway, this liquidity leads to inefficient outcomes as investment is reduced. 4 If
exte'nal, additional financing  is used, this inefficiency  can be avoided.
Sro the extent  that  part  of this financing  would  have been used for investment  purposes  and  that  part  of the
associated  future  output  would  have  been  used for debt  service  to the  same  banks,  the  banks  end up paying  part  of
the DDSR  bill.  Feemandez-Arias  (1992)  presents  financial  savings  under  different  debt-servicing  scenarios  and  the
possible  implications  on investmext.8
More  generally,  changes  in cashflows  affect  liquidity  and investment.  In section  m we
show  that DDSR  operations  are financially  costly  to countries  and, therefore,  cashfiow  savings
are negative  (in present  value). This implies  that cashflow  savings  are not a likely source  of
efficiency  gains  (see  also Fernandez-Arias  (1992)).
XLi~  Cha  in the debtor's  economy: the domestic  indirect benefits
Debt reduction  can lead to indirect  benefits  in the debtor economy. These indirect
benefits  depend  on the specifics  of domestic  economic  policy,  and, in general,  are fuzzy  and
difficult  to predict  pre deal. A case by case analysis  is in general  required 5. The mechanisms
that can bring  about  thuoe  gains  comprise  the following:
(a)  Debtors repay (part of) their debts because a failure to do so would expose them
to the various  penalties  creditors  can  impose. These  penalties  will  be related  to,
among  others,  the country's  access  to goods  and financial  markets. For a highly
indebted  country,  this implies  that actual  repayments  will depend  on the activity
that is subject  to the threat of penalties. This can lead to distortions. For
example,  penalties  may  be related  to trade and an increase  in trade will then be
associated with larger debt repayments.  This implies-at the  margin-a
disincentive  to engage  in trade reforms. More  generally,  the threat  of penalties
can lead to the ixpectation  of a high future "tax" (Sachs, 1990  and Krugman,
1989)  and distort incentives  to engage  in all kind of investments  and reform
efforts (that are often akin to investments).  Depending  on the severity  of the
'Feandez-Aims (1992)  disusses the  ex-post  evidence  on some  of these  domestic  indirect  :ienefits.9
penalties,  debt reduction  can leads  to a reduction  of these  disincentives;
(b)  A second  type of inefficiency  is introduced  by the increased  uncertainty  (about
future  fiscal  and  foreign  exchange  developments)  associated  with  a debt  overhang.
In general,  the negotiation  and bargaining  process  is associated  with  uncertainty
(sometimes  as a result of posturing)  about timing, extent and nature of debt
servicing. In the face  of this uncertainty,  investors  will  often  prefer  to postpone
their  investments  (and  engage  in capital  flight). A DDSR  agreement  can lead  to
a reduction  in uncertainty,  which  can then lead to increased  private  investment
and a repatriation  of flight  capital;
(c)  A third type of inefficiency  may be related to an asymmetry  in information
between  debtors  and creditors,  where  a 'good" debtor  is unable  to convey  to the
creditors  its true characteristics.  To the extent  that DDSR  is advantageous  only
to a good  debtor--when  post deal  the economy  performs  better  than expected  by
the creditors  and the repayments  do not become  a burden  to the country--DDSR
can be used by the debtor to signal its "true" creditworthiness  to investors.
Furthermore,  a large DDSR  deal  that  is supported  by the IFIs (and  accompanied
by their  conditionality)  can  in this  respect  also  act  as a signal  and increase  market
confidence:  the IFIs are presumably  better  informed  about the debtor  and, by
providing  some  of their  own money  in the context  of a DDSR  deal, signal  their
confidence  in the debtor;  and
(d)  A fourth  type  of inefficiency  is related  to the  internal  transfer  that  the government
has to achieve  in order  to collect  the needed  revenue  to service  public  external10
debt.  If the internal transfer is achieved by raising taxes from some economic
sector (e.g., trade, financial  markets), these sectors will be less profitable, and
less iavestment will occur.  Often this will be accompanied  by capital flight.  If
the inflation tax is used to raise the necessary government revenues, relative
prices will likely be distorted  and an inefficient  allocation  of resources can result.
Reductions in public debt service can alleviate these distortions and lead to
efficiency  gains.  Possibly more important  than the cashflow savings in external
debt, discussed in (i) above, is the reduction in domestic interest rates and the
public debt premium as a result of uncertainty reduction and the other factors
previously discussed.
(e)  Last, are domestic political factors.  A DDSR deal may lead to an increased
domestic  acceptance  of austerity as the burden of reforms is now perceived  to be
shared with extemal creditors.  This may make the reform process mc -e viable
and ultimately  lead to increased output and higher repayments  to banks.
(iii)  Effect of DDSR on the creditors:  the extemal indirect benefits
To discuss the effects on the creditors, it is useful to recall the definition of a debt
overhang. A debt overhang is defined as a situation where the existing debt is unlikely to be
serviced in full, leading to a secondary  market discount  and a cut-off  of voluntary  credits.  This
is consistent  with profitable investment opportunities  in the ^ountry. In principle, the existing
creditor group as a  whole could gain by providing the debtor with some liquidity to take
advantage  of existing investment opportunities  and in that way increase the country's capacity11
to repay.  Small  creditors,  however,  will try to escape  the burden  of this concerted  lending
approach  by free-riding  on the efforts  of the larger  creditors. This of course  reduces  the desire
of larger  creditors  to provide  liquidity.
DDSR  can now create  efficiency  gains  if it increases  the scope  for cooperation  among
creditors  by allowing  smaller  creditors  (potential  free-riders)  to exit.  DDSR, if it is deep
ennugh,  can  also create  headroom  for new  types  of creditors.  When  these  new creditors  (e.g.,
international  financial  institutions  (IFIs)  and foreign  direct  investors  (FDI))  provide  additional
value  (e.g., through  their  conditionality  and monitoring  of investments)  or technology  transfers,
whic&'  allows  them  to deal  more  effectively  than  commercial  banks  with  the  particular  problems
of the highly  indebted  countries,  additional  efficiency  gains  may  be realized  (Diwan  and  Rodrik,
1992).
The exact  nature  of these  inefficiencies--and  the gains  from  removing  these  inefficiencies
through  a DDSR  operation--will  depend  most  on three  factors:  the type  of penalties  the country
is exposed  to; the instruments  used  to raise  government  revenues;  and the relationship  between
the country  and its creditors. These  factors  wiU  in general  be hard to quantify  and a case-by-
case analysis  will be required. The only  general  rule that may  be developed  is that DDSR,  by
removing  some disincentives,  can increase  the likelihood  of success of an existing  reform
program  (or  make  it more  likely  that  a reform  program  becomes  acceptable  for the  country),  and
in that  way  lead  to efficiency  gains  and  increased  output. DDSR  is thus  more  likely  a profitable
possibility  when  a good program  is in place,  but unlikely  otherwise.
The DDSR  experiences  are too recent to be fully evaluated  (Femandez-Arias  (1992)
presents  some  preliminary  evidence).  Nevertheless,  they  suggest  that the deals  have  led to very12
favorable results in Mexico and in Venezuela, and moderately favorable ones in the other
countries. In Mexico the debt deal has been associated  with a sharp decline  in domestic  interest
rates 6, and both in Mexico and Venezuela  the stock markets has risen, and a renewed access
to the world financial  markets has occi.red.7  For the other countries, the impact has been less
pronounced.  In case of Costa Rica and the Philippines, policy slippages  and the impact of
adverse internal and extemal shocks (Gulf crisis, earthquake, coup, lower export prices, etc.)
initialy  diluted or dissipated the possible positive effects of the agreements.  In the case of
Uruguay, the agreement is too recent to be able to fully evaluate it.  In all cases, the policy
framework has proven to be the most important factor.
The Net Beneogt  of DDSR
To the extent that the operation entails  efficiency  gains, the debtor country could  benefit
from it.  Note that the country's benefit is a welfare concept, and therefore the benefit is only
the additional  value of the investment  return in excess of that of foregone  current consumption.
These benefits come at a cost to the country.  In order to obtain the net benefit derived by the
debtor country, the financial  cost of the operation needs to be subtracted.  This financial  cost
comprises the direct cost of debt reduction (e.g., the resources paid to banks in a buy-back
operation)  and the change  in the expected  present value of debt service  payments  on outstanding
1he domic  interest rates fell  by about  20 percent  when  the Brady  agreement  was  announced,  and by a further
10 percent towards the end of 1990 (see van Wijnbergen  (1991a  and 1991b)).
'Domestic stock markets  increased  by 25% percent in Mexico  and 116%  percent in Venezuela. Foreign capital
held abroad  by domestic  residents  has flown  back to both Mexico  and Venezuela  in considerable  amounts. Private
and public sector entities  in these two countries  have been able to access voluntarily  the private capital markets  in
significant  amounts (see further the World Debt Tables 1991/1992  and Fernandez-Arias  (1992)). lbe  secondazy
market  prices for both Mexico  and Venezuela  (stripped  of any enhancement  values)  have also  increased  considerably
between  the date of the agreement  and mid-1991,  by about 20 percentage  points, reflecting  further confidence.13
debt claims.
As  discussed  in the next  section,  to a first  approximation  this financial  cost  to the  country
is the mirror  image  of the financial  gains  of external  creditors.  The  financial  gain  of commercial
banks  is a direct result of the operation. The financial  cost to the country  may differ from
commercial  banks' financial  gain, however,  because  other external  creditors  may also incur
financial  gains  or losses  as a result  of DDSR  operations.  The  picture  that  emerges  is one where
the efficiency  gains created  by the operation  are shared  by the debtor country, commercial
banksl and, possibly, other external  creditors.  The country benefits  from the portion of
efficiency  gains  which  are not diverted  to extemal  creditors  in the form of financial  gains.14
II.  FINANCIAL  COST OF DEBT REDUCTION
In this section,  we first analyze  the cost  of debt reduction  and the possible  reasons  why
debt may  be valued  differently  by the debtor  compared  to its creditors. Second,  we review  why
market-based  debt reduction  puts the debtor at a disadvantage  relative to its creditors and
conclude  that the menu-based  approach  minimizes  financial  costs  to the country  when  compared
to both market-based  and concerted  approaches.
Valuation  of countra  debt and  financial  costs
To analyze  the cost  of a dollar  of face  value  of commercial  debt  for the debtor,  we have
to analyze  why it repays  in the first  place. In the absence  of a international  bankruptcy  court
(or the usage  of "gunboats"),  the debtor  will  pay because  in that way  it avoids  penalties  being
imposed.  These  penalties  can  be intertemporal  (trade  sanctions,  withdrawal  of trade  credits,  etc.
see Bulow  and Rogoff  (1989a))  or intertemporal  (exclusion  of future  access  to capital  markets,
see Eaton  and Gersovitz  (1981)).  To  avoid  these  penalties  from  being  imposed  on it, which  may
generate  little  direct  benefits  to the creditors,  the debtor  and the creditors  will try to reach  an
agreement  involving  some  (partial)  payment  by the debtor. Since  the bargaining  power  of the
creditors  will depend  on the severity  of the penalties  they can impose,  the agreement  reached
with  creditors  will  likely  imply  that  the debtor  will  pay in relation  to the severity  of the penalties
the creditors  can successfully  impose  upon  the debtor  (see  Fernandez-Arias  (1991)).
The secondary  market  price of a country's  debt claims  provides  a useful  starting  point
for gauging  the  debt  servicing  prospects  of that  country  as perceived  by its commercial  creditors.1S
As in all relatively  efficient  asset  markets,  it is reasonable  to presume  that the market  value  of
debt represents  the consensus  market  estimate  of the expected  present value of aU future
payments  received  on account  of outstanding  debt claims. The  market  for  debt has  grown  since
1985, and it has become  fairly efficient  and liquid, at least for the large debtor countries.
Transaction  volume  in 1991  is estimated  to have  been  around  $200  billion.
The  present  value  for the  debtor  of its expected  future  debt  service  may  be different  from
the market  value  of debt. Cashflow  payments  made  by countries  may not  exactly  coincide  with
the  receipts  that  banks  effectively  receive  in net  terms  in connection  with  those  payments  because
of tax and regulatory  reasons  as well as the expectation  of third parties bailing  out banks.
Banks--especially  those in a weak financial  position--may  expect to receive from official
institutions  some  side-payments,  or if necessary,  be bailed out by the official  sector, if the
country  is unable  to repay.  Secondary  market  prices  would  then overstate  the expected  value
of payments  by the country  as they  include  payments  by third  parties. 8 While  the situation  wiUl
vary from country  to country,  it can generaUy  be expected  that these  considerations  will lead
creditors  to value debt relatively  more.  This of course makes  DDSR operations  that are
beneficial  to both the debtor  and its creditors  more  difficult  to achieve.
It should  be noted  that  differences  in valuation  of a given  stream  of cash flows  may  arise
from the different  discount  and risk aversion  factors  used  by the debtor  and the creditors.  The
typical indebted  country  is capital-poor,  undiversified,  and shut off from the world capital
market  for lack  of creditworthiness.  It is thus  likely more  impatient  (have a higher  discount
8 Certain  aspects  of banking  regulations  may  exercise  a depressing  effect  on  prices.  But  on a net  basis,  it is hard
to believe  that  due to bankdng  regulations,  the  price  can  be lower  than  the  present  value  of what  the creditors  are
expected  to receive  from the debtor.  If such  a situation  arose, non-banks  would  buy the debt from the banks.
However,  no such  trend  had been  observed  prior to the Brady  plan.16
rate) and more risk-averse han its creditors. Consequently,  it may be not in its interest  to
prepay  debt (which  entails  an efficiency  loss resulting  from  a reduction  of liquidity),  even  at a
fair market-value  from  the creditors'  point of view. It should  be noted  however,  that financial
costs refer to the expected  present  value  of debt service  payments  discounted  at the riskless
market  rate and are therefore  not dependent  on these  differences.
It appears  that, if anything,  to assume  that the country's  expected  future  debt service  is
adequately  reflected  by market  valuations  is a conservative  assumption  regarding  the estimation
of the financial  costs  to the country. Making  such  assumption,  the financial  costs  to the debtor
country equal the financial  gains to its external  creditors.  If only commercial  banks are
financially  affected  by the operation,  we can ignore  other  creditors. To the extent  that other
creditors  are subject  to country  risk, however,  they  are  probably  affected.  Other  private  external
creditors  are likely  gainers:  they  benefit  from  the rise in value  of their  claims  as a result  of debt
reduction  and improved  country's  prospects  without  increasing  their exposure. In the case of
official  creditors,  there is the countervailing  factor  that they generally  increase  their exposure
by providing  additional  financing. If official  claims  are risldess, official  creditors  are not
financially  affected  by definition. If official  claims  are subject  to country  risk, however,  the
financial  impact  is ambiguous.  The  total financial  cost  to the country  would  then  amount  to the
total financial  gains  of abe external  creditorse,  that is financial  gains  to commercial  banks  and
other  private  creditors  plus  the financial  gains  (or minus  the financial'losses)  of official  creditors.
We  will  estimate  in the  next section  the financial  costs  to the country  as the net payment
made  in exchange  for debt reduction  minus the reduction  in the market  value  of outstanding
9And  other foreign  investors  if applicable.17
debt. This reduction  in value  is determined  not only  by the amount  of debt  reduction  achieved
but also by the method  of financing. For example,  if new senior loans are used to finance
DDSR, the value of commercial  bank debt falls for a given amount  of debt reduction  (see
Claessens,  Diwan, Froot and Krugman,  (1991)  for more details). In the remainder  of this
section  we  will  show  that  a menu-based  approach  to debt  reduction  minimizes  this  payment  and,
therefore,  the financial  cost of a given  DDSR  operation.
Minimizng financial  cost:  the case  for menu-based  debt reduction
It is useful  to think that debt reduction,  and DDSR  more  generally,  affects  two basic
parameters:  the size  of the economic  pie generated  by the debtor  country  (the  efficiency  gains),
and its sharing  between  the various  stakeholders  (the interest  groups  in the debtor  country,  the
banks  and the  other  creditors). For  the debtor,  benefits  from  DDSR  crucially  depend  on a larger
economic  pie.  The mechanisms  used  for DDSR  will matter  in determining  the sharing  of the
gains. We will show  that a pure market-based  approach  generally  favors  the creditors  at the
expense  of the debtor. In a menu-based  approach,  the debtor  can  retain  as much  as possible  the
efficiency  gains.
Market-based  DDSR
When  considering  the costs and benefits  of market-based  DDSR, it is important  to
understand  the effects  that are intrinsic  to the market-place.  In all asset markets  where sellers
are atomistic,  it is quite  difficult  for a buyer  to internalize  a general  value  increase  associated
with its purchase  of an asset. In the context  of country  debt, this implies  that there are two18
reasons why market-based  DDSR leads to an overpayment  by the debtor.
(a)  Market-based  DDSR occurs at the average  price of debt. However, the financial  benefit
of DDSR to the country is only the marginal  decrease in the value of debt--the marginal
price.  The marginal price will be lower than the average price since debt service in the
bad states of nature is not strictly  proportional  to the quantity  of debt outstanding  (Bulow
and Rogoff, 1989b  and 1991).
(b)  The market price of debt rises following  DDSR.  With less debt around, the remaining
debt is more likely serviced. In a rational market, an announced  DDSR operation will
not occur at the lower, pre deal price but at the higher, post deal price (Dooley, 1989).
T-he  compounded effect of these two factors is that the market value of debt will be
reduced by less than the expenditure  the country makes. In fact, the difference  between  the pre
deal and post deal price provides all banks--those  that exit as well as those that remain-with a
capital  gain compared  to their status-quo  and implicitly  the debtor makes transfers to the exiting
as well as remaining  banks. 10
The case of Bolivia is illustrative  of the direct losses that arise in market-based  DDSR
(see Bulow  and Rogoff (1989b)). In 1986, Bolivia  began negotiations  with both outside  donors
and its creditors  that ultimately  led to an extemally financed  buyback in March 1988, completely
financed by a donation.  Bolivia owed its commercial banks $670 million in debt and $300
million in interest arrears.  Debt was valued by the market at $40.2 million on the eve of the
buyback  negotiations  in September  1986 (i.e., 6 cents on the dollar).  The 1988 buyback  retired
$335 million of debt (with their arrears) at a price of 11 cents, implying an expense of $36.9
'0This  does  not imply  that  market-based  DDSR  necessarily  hurts  the  debtor,  but  that  indirect  or efficiency  gains
arising  from  DDSR  have to be large  enough  to compensate  for the  direct  loss.19
million which was funded by the external donation. After the transaction in March 1988, the
remaining $335 million of claims were valued at $36.9 million.  The operation thus reduced
Bolivia's expected payments by only $3.3  million (40.2-36.9), and creditors net gain was
$36.9-$3.3=$33.6  million.  Clearly, creditors received most, but not all, of the donation.
Assuming  Bolivia would have received the grant anyhow,  it would likely have been better off
if it had used the grants for some other purpose.
Concerted  versus Market-based  deals
We have argued above that if debt is reduced by the debtor through a market-based
operation, then the price that must be paid is the average price of claims after debt reduction
because any lender can choose between selling or retaining claims, a reflection of the market-
based character of the operation.  Concerted agreements  could conceivably  be worked out to
overcome this coordination  problem. Ideally, each creditor bank would sell a specific share of
its claims at its marginal price.  (An even lower price would imply that banks are hurt, which
would not be feasible to the extent that banks' participation  is voluntary.)  In practice, banks
may retain bargaining  power and may be able to obtain higher-than-marginal  prices even with
perfect coordination. Furthermore, perfect coordination  may not work because it is difficult to
bar individual banks from free-riding.  But even a small amount of coordination would still
represent an advantage  to the country  over the simple  market-based  approach to the extent that
less than the ex-post average price is paid.
A more important  problem with the concerted approach is, however, the heterogeneity
of banks and the imperfect  observability  of this heterogeneity. If creditors  differ in their relative20
valuation  of country  debt,  a DDSR  operation  that  does  not discriminate  between  banks,  and that
at the same  time  hurts  no bank, must  occur  at the reservation  price  of the bank  with the highest
valuation. This may prove extremely  costly. Attempts  to discriminate  between  banks in a
concerted  approach  require unobservable  information  and are subject to adverse selection
problems.
Experience  with  concerted  approaches  brought  these  problems  to the surface. Concerted
agreements  focusing  on new  lending  characterizec  the 1982-88  period. The  process,  however,
broke  down  over time as the interests  of the different  banks  increasingly  diverged. By 1988,
the new money  process  came  to a halt--in  spite  of U.S. Secretary  Baker's  repeated  calls for a
strategy  of "growth  out of debt". The banks  that valued  the claims  the most  were inclined  to
press for a continuation  of the concerted  new  money  approach,  while  those  with  low exit cost
opposed  the process,  and free rode  at an increasing  rate (possibly  on official  creditors  in part).
The case for a menu-based  approach  to debt  reduction
By 1988,  investment  banks  were  worldng  hard  on schemes  that would  allow  the low  exit
cost banks to leave rather than further veto concerted  new money  deals.  Equipped  with its
recent experience  with informal  swaps (that extinguished  over $10 billion  of private  debt in
1988),  Brazil  innovated  by developing  the first menu-based  deal in 1988.  This was followed
by the Mexican  Morgan  deal  of 1989. This led the way  for the more  sophisticated  menu-driven
deals  of the Brady  plan. The menu-based  approach  allows  the creditors  to self-selt,  with  only
those  with  low valuations  selling  out at a particular  price and others  remaining,  while  avoiding
any free-riding. We will argue below  that this menu-based  approach  retains  the coordination21
features  of the concerted  approach  but is more  efficient  than  it.
Recent agreements  (Brazil 1988,  Mexico 1989, Philippines  1989, Costa Rica 1989,
Venezuela  1990,  Uruguay  1991,  Nigeria  1992,  and some  deals  under  negotiation)  have  used  an
approach  different  from market-based  and concerted  to reduce  external  debt. The agreements
have  included  a menu  of options  from which  creditors  select. This pre deal  agreed-upon  menu
is thus  a contract,  that may be partly  implicit,  establishing  a future  choice  set for the lenders.
The menu  approach  requires  that lenders  choose  from  a restricted  set of actions  post  deal, and
therefore,  like in a concerted  approach,  cannot  free  ride. The  possible  means  for enforcing  such
a choice  include  creditor  country  legal  and  political  institutions.  In the  Brady  deals  to date, free-
riding has been prevented  through  a variety  of mechanisms,  including  "novation",  political
pressures  and forms of financial  engineering. For example,  in the Mexico  1989  agreement,
existing  debt  contracts  were  rewritten  such  that  the  previous  agreements,  both  between  the  debtor
and the creditors  and among  creditors,  were no longer  binding-the  so called  novation." In
the Venezuela  and Uruguay  agreements,  fully collateralized,  short-term  notes were used to
overcome  a restriction  on buybacks.  Political  pressures  were particularly  strong  in the case of
Mexico. In addition,  the IFIs have  at times  made  it clear that they would  condone  arrears to
commercial  creditors  (and lend into arrears themselves)  if the country  had negotiated  in good
faith  but no agreement  was reached,  thus  increasing  pressure  on all banks  to recontract.
"The major implication  of this novation  was that debt which  is exchanged  into the new instruments  (including
some of the new money provided)  would  no longer be subject  to the shaaing  class  and non-participating  creditors
would not be able to share equally in payments made by Mexico  on its retructured debt. For instance, in case
Mexico  would  pay in full on the new instumments,  but would  not pay in full on debt which was not exchanged,  the
holders of the non-exchanged  debt would  not be able to share in the payments  the holders of the new instruments
receive. The "novation  clause gave claim holders a greater incentive to accept one of the three options and
drastically  reduced the problem  of free-riders.22
Discrimination  can lead to gains for the debtor country.  By combining concerted and
choice characteristics,  the menu-based  approach to DDSR retains the advaniages, but not the
drawbacks  of each of the two mechanisms  described  above. The options on the menu and their
relative pricing  are negotiated  first; in a second  round, each creditor freely chooses  his preferred
option.  By negotiating  on a menu pre deal and allowing  banks to choose post deal, a better
burden  sharing among  the  commercial banks can  be  achieved without  unsurmountable
coordination  problems, and the debtor country can get a better overall deal. In effect, the menu-
based approach to DDSR can allow the debtor country to act as a discriminating  monopsonist:
by judiciously tailoring the relative terms and prices of items on the menu, the debtor extracts
more from each creditor.
What have  been the tools used to achieve  this discrimination?  Recent menus  have offered
banks to swap their old claims for a portfolio of exit instruments--and sometimes for cash
(buybacks)--or  for a commitment  to provide new money, so as to accommodate  the needs  of the
banks that prefer to exit as well as those of the banks that prefer to remain exposed to the
country.  Buybacks have not been used extensively, and in  most deals, DDSR has been
accomplished  by exchanging  old debt for new instruments--exit  bonds--with  a lower contractual
obligation  but, also, with a higher security. The latter has been achieved by pledging a secure
asset (usually US Treasury bills or bonds) against specific  payments of the bond (see further
Annex table 1 for a description of the actual instruments used in  recent agreements).  The
contractual reduction in  obligations has been offered in  several ways to  accommodate the
regulatory, accounting,  and tax practices of the different types of banks and the liquidity  needs
of the country.  In particular, two instruments have been heavily used, a discount bond that23
reduces the principal obligation, and a par bond that reduces the interest rate. 12
It is clear that exit instruments  can be tailored to minimize the cost of debt reduction.
But there may be some banks (with  very high exit cost) that would  only be willing to exit when
the value of the exit instruments  is very high.  To buy out the high exit cost banks using an exit
menu  option would  dramatically  increase  the cost of debt reduction  to the debtor since all banks
would tend to choose this more valuable option. On the other hand, allowing  the high exit cost
banks to remain on the sideline, would imply a breakdown  of the whole menu approach.
In the recent menu-based  deals, this problem was addressed by requiring any bank that
refused to exit at a "reasonable"  price to contribute  something  else.  Since non-exiting  banks get
a capital gain on their existing exposure, they were required to remit (part) of this capital gain
through  a new money "tax".  As an illustration of this mechanism,  consider the situation  where
the pre deal price is 40 cents and the post deal price rises to 45 cents, a 5 cents gain.  If
remaining, non-exiting banks holding $30 billion of claims provide now $2.7 billion in new
money,  they will have  a loss on the new money  of (100-45)*$2.7  billion = $1.5 billion. It turns
out that they are still equally well off as in the  status-quo since the capital gain on their
remaining  claims, 5*$30 billion = $1.5 billion, will offset exactly the loss on the new money.
In this way, the overall costs to the debtor of DDSR is not determined  by the reservation  price
of the high exit cost bank.
The importance  of banks' heterogeneity  deserves a more detailed substantiation. Banks
can differ for a number of reasons. The reasons include differences  in national regulatory and
tax framework (Hay and Paul 1991);  the extent to which a commercial  bank has other business
'2More recently, par bonds where the interest rate start. at low levels and is stepped up over time have also beer
introduced (so-called FLIRBs).24
interests in the debtor country creating an ey ra benefit to lending; differences in expectations
(Williamson, 1989); altemative business opportunities;  and bank size in the presence of fixed
costs associated  with recontracting  and monitoring  the debtor's economy  (Fernandez  and Ozler,
1991). The existence  of a secondary  market for sovereign  debt suggests  that the marginal  value
of a debt claim siiould  be the same for all participating  banks.  In a sense, the market should
already neutralize the effects of any bank heterogeneity. If this were the case, the arguments
for using a menu would be weak and a simple concerted  agreement would be as effective.
But it seems unlikely  that the secondary  i'iarket is able to fully take away the effects of
heterogeneity. This is because banks that sell debt at a discount face exit costs which depends
on the particular situation of the exiting bank.  For example, accounting  practices and capital
adequacy rules in  the United States discourage bankers with relatively large  exposure to
participate in debt reduction by requiring a bank that sells part of its loans to a given country
to mark down whole or part of its portfolio of loans to  that country. For U.S  banks with
relatively large exposure this would mean wiping out a large portion of reserves.  Similarly,
banks with large exposure  may face higher regulatory  costs when buying a claim than banks with
small exposures.  The existence  of exit and entry cost thus creates a wedge between the price
at which debt is sold, and the net payout that accrues to the seller, and vice-versa  when debt is
bought. As a result, debt may not be transacted  at all in the secondary  market when differences
in valuation are smaller than this wedge.  And if trading occurs, the secondary market price
observed will likely reflect the lower end of banks' valuations.
While heterogeneity  may give rise to a secondary  market, the market is thus not likely
to eliminate  the effects of heterogeneity  completely. Because  of heterogeneity,  the menu-based25
approach allows the debtor therefore to pay less for the same debt reduction, compared to
market-based  and concerted  DDSR, by exploiting  the differences  among  banks arising from the
structure of their balance sheet, the regulatory system within which they operate, and their
overall business strategies.  The menu can create "value" through offering instruments better
suited to the systems or situations in which the individual bank operates."  For example, a
bank that wants to exit, but cannot afford the regulatory cost of  a full exit,  may prefer a
par-bond that  allows it  to  spread the regulatory costs of  exit over  a  number of  years.
Heterogeneity  across lenders also implies that the choices the banks make from a menu will
depend  on their own characteristics." 4
"Although both parties see it as additional  value, to the extent that it is obtained  through regulatory and tax
loopholes  there is no true efficiency  gains involved,  but rather the shifting  of risks and losses to creditor countries
and their taxpayers. From the debtor country's point of view, the case for using the menu-approach  does not rely
on the assumption  that the financial  cost to the country  is the mirror image  of financial  gains to external creditors;
it is entirely  based on how various negotiation  mechanism  affect  the payment  needed  to compensate  banks  in a given
DDSR agreement.
'4This  issue is explored in depth in Demirguc-Kunt  and Diwan (1990) who show, using the experience  of the
Brazil 1988 debt deal, that 80 percent of bank choices between  exit and relending  options can be explained  by
measures of financial strength, natiouality, exposure, and long term interest in the country (as proxied by the
existence  of branch offices in the debtor country). See also Diwan and Spiegel (1991) and Diwan and Kletzer
(1991).26
III.  EXPERIENCE OF BRADY DEALS
We now discuss  the five most recent menu-based  deals: Mexico, Philippines,  Costa Rica,
Venezuela, and Uruguay.  The agreements  are described in Annex table 1 (more detail can be
found in World Bank 1990 and 1991).  Negotiations were relatively slow in Mexico, the
Philippines  and Costa  Rica. In each of the three cases, the approach followed  was an innovation
relative to previous deals. Mexico's strategy was to spread the needed debt reduction among a
large group of banks, to develop a simple menu, and to work hard on contractual  issues--such
as the novation  clause--in  order to produce marketable  securities. The lack of a buyback  option
in the Mexico deal was due to the fact that many of the smaller banks had already exited in
previous deals.  The Philippines  negotiations  proceeded  in parallel, but the approach followed
was rather different. The main goal there seems  to have  been the exit of a large fringe of small
banks, with the expectation  that a sizable amount of new money could be extracted from the
remaining  large banks who could (for strategic  or financial  reasons)  afford to take  a longer view.
The Costa Rica negotiations  were also slowed down by the search for innovative  solutions. The
main problem there was how to treat arrears in the context of a menu deal. On the other hand,
the negotiations  proceeded quite briskly for Venezuela and Uruguay, where the degree of
innovation  was modest.
ne  extent of debt reduction
Table 1 reports for each of the countries the eligible commercial  and total debt before
the exchange. In all cases, non-commercial  claims, short term debt as well as bonds were left
out from the eligible base.  While the official sector shared in  the debt relief burden by
providing  loans or reschedulings,  short term debt and bonds were not subjected  to rescheduiings27
or DDSR.  The eligible debt as a share of total debt varied from 59 percent in Venezuela  to 23
percent for the Philippines.
Since the deals involved  various bond exchanges  and buybacks,  as well as provisions  of
new money, the net present value (NPV) of DDSR is used as the measure of the extent of
contractual  debt reduction achieved  and the degree of exit involved. Table 1 reports separately
as well as combined the NPV of debt reduction and debt service reduction, with the effect of
recapture clauses shown separately (see Claessens and van Wijnbergen (forthcoming)  for the
calculations).  This measure of debt reduction, before taldng into account the new money
provided by commercial  banks, is the Gross DDSR.  The largest relative amounts of Gross
DDSR were for Costa Rica and Uruguay (71 and 49 percent respectively), where DDSR was
to a large extent achieved  through buybacks. Mexico, Venezuela, and the Philippines  reduced
their initial eligible debts by between 20 percent and 30 percent.  Net DDSR, that is Gross
DDSR minus new money  from commercial  banks, also shown  in Table 1, is of course smaller.
An important  feature of most of the deals that needs to be taken into account  in arriving
at a final measure of the effective  debt relief is the impact of collateralization  of part of the new
debt.  The up-front purchase of collateral  in the form of secure foreign bonds is essentially  a
prepayment  of the collateralized  debt service obligation: the resources needed for payment are
already set aside beyond the country's control and are not subject to country risk.  Therefore,
from the point of view of commercial  banks these resources are financially  equivalent  to cash
and, like in an actual prepayment,  the corresponding  debt obligation  is no longer a claim on the
country's future resources. Table 1 also reports the prepayment  equivalent  of both principal and28
interest collateral." 5
The best  way to  summarize the  overall commercial debt relief achieved in  these
operations is now the "debt reduction equivalent"  or DRE.  The DRE is defined as the Net
DDSR plus the portion of  debt that is implicitly prepaid through the provision of  suitable
collateral.  Table 1 presents the DRE for each of the five countries. The DRE ranged from 10
percent of the original face value in the case of the Philippines  to over 70 percent in the case
of Costa Rica.  The shallowness  of debt reduction  in the case of the Philippines  was mainly due
to its success in attracting new money, which more than financed  the compensation  to exiting
banks." 6 In the aggregate, for the five countries combined,  commercial  bank debt was reduced
by more one third.
Table 2 reports the financing of the enhancements,  in the form of additional and non-
additional (set-aside) loans, new money from the commercial banks and the country's own
resources, the latter including  the set-asides  loans. It is worth noting at the outset the distinction
between the additional and non-additional  official loans used to finance the enhancements.
Additional  loans would not have accrued to the country in the absence of the agreement.  In
practice, the distinction  between funds that have already been committed  and new funds is often
fuzzy.  We consider here the IFIs' set-asides as the only non-additional  loans.  Of the total
financing,  44% was from additional,  official loans; the remainder was equally divided between
commercial banks' new loans and diversion of the country's own resources (including set-
'We will discuss  later  the distinction  between  principal and  interest  collateralization  and the valuation  of the
later,
"6It  should be noted,  however, that the new money component  of the  arangement  came several  months after
the buy-back  and  could  be considered  a separate agreement. In that case, commercial  bank debt reduction  in the
Philippines  would be on the order of 20 percent.29
asides).  Table 2  also reports  how the  resources were divided over  buybacks, principal
collateralization  and interest support.
On the whole, taldng into account the additional, official  loans, the five countries' total
external  debt was effectively  reduced by about one ninth. The reduction  ranged from essentially
zero in the case of the Philippines  to slightly over 20 percent in Costa Rica.
Cost reduction in Menu-based  erations
An important issue in  evaluating the arrangements is whether the use of the menu
approach  has allowed the debtor to reduce  debt at better than post deal prices. We argued above
that a menu approach  would allow for debt reduction  below the post deal price whereas market-
based debt reduction would occur at the post deal price. For buybacks this can in principle be
established  by comparing the buyback price with the post deal price. In case of a new money
call, the effective value creditors receive is the post deal value of its original deal claims
(rescheduled  debts-including the capital gain on it-and  the new money provided) minus the
capital loss on the new money  they provide. Its associated  effective  price can then be compared
to the post deal price. In a debt exchange, old debt is swapped  for a new instrument  which is
a combination  of uncollateralized  (reduced payments) claims and risldess enhancements. For
each unit of old debt, the creditors therefore receive some enhancements,  which amount to a
prepayment--or  a partial buyback, and a capital gain on the uncollateralized  portion as the debt
price increases.
In the context of a debt exchange, the question regarding the concertedness of  the
agreement is  whether the debtor has received sufficient concessions from its creditors in30
exchange for  the capital gain they experience on  the uncollateralized portion of  the  new
instruments.  If the debt exchange is market-based, the capital gain is not  taxed, i.e,  the
uncollateralized  portion of the debt "free-rides". The net result is that the ratio of enhancements
(net of new money and valuing the interest collateral  appropriately)  to the DRE is equal to (or
above) the post deal debt price.  If the exchange is part of a menu agreement, then banks are
asked to also provide concessions in  exchange for the capital gain on  the uncollateralized
portion. In that case, the ratio of net enhancements  to the DRE will be below the post deal debt
price and the arrangement  would be equivalent to a partial buyback  below the post deal price.
We can  now analyze the behavior of  debt prices at the time the agreements were
finalized.  Since the prices quoted before and after the exchange are  prices of  different
instruments--the  deal retires old, non-enhanced  claims and replaces them with new instruments
which are combinations  of country risk and enhancements--we  need to extract from the prices
of these instruments  a post deal debt price that is comparable to the pre deal price. In other
words, the raw prices need to be stripped  of the values of the principal  collateral  and the interest
guarantee.  Except for the interest guarantee--a  financial  innovation--this  is a simple task (see
the discussion  on the DRE). To obtain  an estimate  of the value of the interest guarantee,  we use
the model of Clark (1990)  who obtains an estimate of the value as one minus the stripped debt
price, times the face value of the interest collateral.' 7
Table  3  reports  the  post deal prices  extracted from  the  raw prices  of  enhanced
"Mhis  model  has the following  desirable  property:  if the debt price  is one, the interest  guarantee  does not
provide  any  additional  value,  while  it provides  full  additional  value  if the  debt  price  is zero. Fernandez-Arias  (1992)
presents  the case  when the interest  guarantee's  market  value is set at its face  value.31
instruments  immediately  after the exchanges  took  place." 8 Table  3 can  be used  to compare  the
post  deal (stripped)  price  in each  deal  with  the applicable  price of the old claims  at the time  of
the exchange. This price represents  the average  value  per unit of debt the creditors  got in the
deal (AVC). Table 3 also reports  an estimate  of the pre deal  price (see  below).
We can use the AVC  as a measure  of how market-based  the deal was: if the AVC  is
close  to the post  deal  price,  then the deal  is not much  different  from  a market-based  operation.
However,  if the AVC is below the post deal price, then the concerted  deal is significantly
cheaper  than a market-based  operation.  Table  3 shows  that the AVCs  are below  the post  deal
stripped  prices.  This  is thus  direct  evidence  that the terms  at which  debt reduction  was  achieved
were better than what would have occurred  under a market-based  approach.  The difference
between  the AVC  and the post  deal  price  is the greatest  for Costa  Rica  and the smallest  for the
Philippines.
The AVC  and the post-deal  allows  us to compute  that the cost  of DDSR,  if done  using
the market-based  approach,  would have costed  more than $8 billion over the cost actually
incurred using the concerted  menu approach." 9 Therefore  the coordination  and efficiency
achieved  with the menu  approach  may  have  saved  the countries  more  than $8 billion.  This $8
billion  saving  may  amount  to a cost  reduction  of more  than  50%  when  compared  to an estimate
of the total  financial  cost, developed  below.
18Arguably  a more recent price could be used since there is some evidence  of a 'learning curve" in the market
for sovereign  debt, making the initial post deal price a less useful indicator. It also appears that the market has
become more efficient. For instance,  for a few months after the initial  introduction  of the Mexican  Brady bonds,
the stripped prices of the par  and discount bond differed considerably from each other (leading to arbitrage
opportunities),  but this difference  vanished  in the third month  of trading. But more recent price are also dependant
on the exogenous  shocks that occurred after the exchange.
'9This larger market-based  approach cost can be constructed  as an upper estimate  of the size of the indirect
benefits  obtained  from DDSR along the lines of the methodology  developed  in Bulow and Rogoff (1991).32
Fnancial galns  of commewM banks
The AVC gives an a;veae measure  of the value retained  by each creditor. A closer look
at the prices of each of the instruments  right after the exchange took place reveals that some  of
the options on the menu (normalized  per unit of old debt) had different  post deal values. At the
same time, not all banlks  chose the same options at the actual exchange. This can only be
because of differences  in valuation  between  banks of the various options. If all banks valued the
options in the same way, then they all would have picked the option expected to offer post deal
the highest  value. The clearest  example  is provided by the Venezuelan  agreement (see Table 4).
Excluding the new money option (this option was rationed as it was oversubscribed)2',  the
different  exit options ranged  in value between  45 and 49 cents. Yet many of the banks chose the
least valuable option (the buyback), indicating  that because of heterogeneity, options with the
same intrinsic market value do not have the same opportunity  value to each individual  bank.
From the debtor country's perspective, the larger the difference between the AVC and
the post deal, the better the deal it obtained. However, a large difference  between the AVC  and
the post deal price is not a sufficient  for the deal to be 'good" for the debtor compared to the
status quo since the AVC may still be higher than the price that would have prevailed in the
absence of a DDSR agreement. Figures 1 to 5 depict for each deal the AVC and the series of
prices prevailing  from before the announcement  of the Brady  plan until the date of the exchange.
As can be observed, market prices moved  in anticipation  of the finalization  of the agreement,
the date of the exchange. Indeed, in the few weeks  before the exchange  actually took place, debt
prices converged  smoothly  toward the AVC  as the uncertainty  about whether  the exchange  would
I  In te  cas of Venezela, oil prices  moved  up betwee th agreement  date  and  the actusl  exchanp (becauw
of the Gulf  cnisis).  As a result,  Venezuela's  debt  became  more  valuable,  and  more  banks  than  exper d chose  the
Mw Money  optioa  which  thus  had  to be restricted.33
actually  take  place  was reduced.
The status  comparison  price should  thus  not be the price right  before  the exchange  but
instead  be taken when expectations  about a deal were sufficiently  low. In the absence  of
exogenous  shocks  during  the interim  period, the best the debtor  can hope to achieve  without
hurting  the banks  is an AVC  which  is equal  to the  price  prevailing  before  DDSR  was  considered
a possibility. However,  Figures  1-5  make  it clear that in most  cases,  the AVCs  were halfway
between  the  post  deal  prices  and the  prices  prevailing  when  expectations  about  a value  increasing
agreement  where still low (say  the date  right before  the Brady speech). 21 The overall  picture
that emerges  is that the deals  were done at prices  halfway  between  a market-based  transaction
and a concerted  operation  that would  have  left banks  at their  initial  payoff  level. On the basis
of this analysis,  banks  would  thus  appear  to have  gained  substantially.
That  commercial  banks  made  financial  gains  should  not be surprising  since  the operations
are voluntary  in nature  and, therefore,  they do no expect  to lose. Nevertheless,  prices  moved
because  of severl exogenous  events,  particularly  the oil price increase  due the Gulf  crisis  and
changes  in world interest  rates, which makes  it difficult  to develop  a point estimate  of the
changes  in prices  due to aU  exogenous  shocks  (see  Claessens  and van Wijnbergen  (1991)  for a
methodology).  Instead  one can investigate  whether  the price at which  banks  would  not have
made  a gain, the AVC, is likely  to have  prevailed  without  exogenous  shocks. The use of debt
valuation  models  based  on fundamental  underlying  variables  strongly  suggests  that  the applicable
pre-deal  price, cleaned  from  expectations,  is in general  well  below  the AVC  and  that, therefore,
banks  made  gains. While  secondary  market  prices  have  been  erratic  and do thus  not provide
21  Femandez-Airia  (1992)  obtas  redwlt  that the average  market  prices would  hae  to be 32 cents
downward  biased  to make  the aggregate  financial  cost  to the countries  zero. Valuing  the interest  guarantee  at one
minus  the  post deal  price, this necessay  downwad  bias  become  15  cents.34
an accurate  measure  of expected  payments,  there  is no strong  reason  to expect  a systematic  and
substantial  bias.
The  gains  per unit  value  can  be translated  into  absolute  gains, measured  by the difference
between  the market  value  of the aggregate  portfolio  held by the banks after and before the
exchange  using  the average  market  prices  in the month  before  the Brady  plan was announced
(March  10, 1989).Y (See  Table  5.)  On aggregate,  the banks  increased  the value  of their  loan
portfolios  by $5.3 billion.'  In all cases  banks  gained  from the deal, with the ranking  of the
relative  gains as follows:  Costa Rica, Venezuela,  the Philippines,  and Mexico, followed  by
Uruguay.
Financial cost to debtor counties
We finally  turn to an overall  evaluation  of these  agreements  from the debtors'  point  of
view. This is achieved  by developing  estimates  of the direct  financial  costs  of the agreements
to the debtor, the counterpart  to the gains of  the (commercial)  creditors, using market
information.  If no other creditor  is subject  to country  risk, the financial  cost to the country  is
the counterpart  to the financial  gain of the commercial  banks.  Otherwise,  capital  gains  on
existing  debt of other  creditors  benefiting  from  commercial  bank  debt  reduction  also  need  to be
counted  as financial  cost. In addition,  for the official  creditors,  additional  lending  may entail
losses.  Non-additional,  official  loans would  have been extended  to the country  even in the
I  The value  after the  exchange  is the total value  of all the new instruments  including  the new money  provided,
plus the cash received from buybacks  minus the face value  of new money  provided.
"The gains are much larger when evaluated  at more recent prces. There are two exogenous  reasons for this
phenomenon.  Clearly, the (unexpected)  decline in interest rates from about 10% at the time of the Brady-speech
to about 6% in 1991 has increased  the value of those insttuments  with fixed interest rates. In addition, the Gulf
crisis led to increased  export eanings  for Mexico and Venezuela-and better prospects  for their oil industry in
general. But there are also indications  of some learning, with the market discovering  that DDSR agreements  had
a much more positive effect than expected  for some countries.35
absence  of a debt agreement. We therefore  continue  to treat those funds as if they came from
the country's own reserves.
When atl other debt is assumed  to be riskless, the financial  cost of the agreement  for the
country is the difference between the market value of commercial  bank claims before the
agreement  and just after the exchange  of instruments.  As reported in Table 5, the gains to the
banks for all countries were $5.3 billion, which implies that the total loss for the countries  is
also $5.3 billion.
This assumes that official loans are riskless, i.e.,  that they are expected to  be fully
serviced in the future.  This assumption  may influence  the estimate of the direct costs to the
extent that existing official claims are impaired and, correspondingly,  new, additional loans
contain an implicit "grant" element. Since there is no consensus  on the precise status and price
of official  debt, we assume as an alternative that official and commercial  loans have the same
seniority  status (see Bulow, Rogoff  and Bevilaqua  (1992)  for analytical  and empirical  findings
on the relative seniority  of official  claims). Since we have no prior on the status  of other, non-
official  debts, we treat these  debts  also as if they have  the same  value as commercial  debts. The
debtors' financial  costs under this scenario  is then  reduced  by the grant element  on the additional
official  loans, which are only valued at the post deal stripped  price instead of at one.  The cost
will be increased, however,  because  of the capital  gain other creditors  received  as a result of the
DDSR deal, i.e.,  the change in the market value of other debt outstanding, calculated by
applying the difference between the pre deal and post deal stripped price to all other debt
(inclusive  of the set-asides).
The estimated  costs under this altemative turn out to be much larger than in the riskless
other debt scenario. For the five deals, we get a total direct cost of $18.4 billion (see Table 5).
The large loss is due to the large capital  gains other creditors  make as a result of the DDSR; on36
average,  the post deal price is 18 cents higher  than the pre deal price.  But, the additional
official  loans  are now  only  valued  at the post  deal  price  instead  of at one.  Thus, the capital  gain
of the other  creditors  is somewhat  offset  and, on net, a $13.1  billion  gain  for the other  creditors
results.  This  translates  into  a 40 percent  increase  when  compared  to the initial  market  (value  of
their  claims  valued  at the  pre deal  commercial  bank  price). Tbe  commercial  banks  gain  remains
$5.3  billion,  or a 19 percent  increase  compared  to their  pre deal market  value.37
IV.  !CONCLUDNG  R1EMARKS
Our main analytical  conclusions  are twofold: a DDSR operation  is likely to be financially
costly for the debtor country  mainly  because  banks would  not voluntarily  enter into agreements
that reduce their payoff; and this financial  cost can be minimized  if the deal follows  the menu-
based approach, where the expected  rise in debt price for non-exiters  is taxed away.
An evaluation of the recent menu driven agreements  supports these conclusions.  First,
debt reduction was achieved at better than market-based  terms.  Second, the success of the
menu-based  approach  has been  relative  rather than complete,  in the sense that DDSR  deals have
still provided banks with important  gains relative to before the Brady deal was announced.
Therefore, a DDSR agreement is still only beneficial to the debtor country when the
DDSR leads to significant  efficiency  improvements  in its economy  or in its external financial
relations. The Brady agreements  are too recent to allow  us to quantify  exactly  the actual impact
on the debtors' macroeconomy  using economic  aggregates. In addition,  other factors may  have
affected  those aggregates  (most notably the extent of the adjustment  effort, the recent changes
in world interest  rates, and the recent  Gulf-crisis). The important  policy  implication  nevertheless
is that DDSR  agreements--since  they  always  involve costs for the debtor-can only  provide  gains
to the debtor in the context  of an adjustment  and reform strategy  when there are good reasons
to believe  that the efficiency  gains will compensate  for the direct financial  losses.
Implications  of our analysis  for actual DDSR-proposals  are the following:  (i) using the
recent  experience, identify better how  DDSR  influences the  domestic economy.  An
improvement  in our understanding  of the way in which  efficiency  gains come about  can lead to
larger future indirect benefits,  allowing  the debtor to ask for larger current concessions  from the
banks; (ii) improve the financial  engineering  in the deals.  In particular, agreements  could be
indexed  on any exogenous  uncertainty  between signing  of agreement  and actual  exchange. This38
would  reduce  the occurrences  of mispricing  of some  options  and can increase  confidence  that
there is sufficient  financing  for enhancements;  and (iii) to allow the debtor countries  to
successfully  resolve their debt crisis--and  not to let the Brady plan increase  the payoff  of
commercial  banks, the bargaining  power  of the debtors  needs  to be strengthened.39
Table 1: Debt Face  Values  and DDSR
gmllions of dolars unless  noted otherwise)
Total  External  Commercial  Bank  Debt'  Debt  Debt  RecGpture  Gross DDSR Debt  (2)  Reduction' Service  Cl&ue4  C6)= (3)+(4)-MS)
(1)  (3)  Reductimn  (5)
S  X  of  Total  (4)  B  of  Cmercial
___________  ______________  __________ 
____________  ~~  ~~~Bank  Debt
MEXICO  $95.416  $47,170  49X  S7.061  S7.948  S858  S14.151  302
PHILIPPINES  S28.468  S6.600  23X  S1,340  S0  S1.340  202
COSTA  RICA  S4.603  S1 608  351  S1.029  5115  S1  144  711
VENEWUELA  US23.491  S19  O1l  59X  S1.921  $2 67  S186  243412  2
URGtUiAY  S3.707  S1,610  43X  S628  S169  S11  S786  49X
TOTAL  S164.685  S75,999  46X  S119799  11  055  S21,833  29X
Nc- Non?  met  COSR  Prepayment  Prepayment  Prepayment  Debt Reduction  Equivalent (7)  (8)=C6)-(7)  Equivalent  Equivalent Equivalent of  (DRE)
of  of Interest  Collateral  (12)+M8)+(11)
Principal  Collateral7  (11)=(9)+(10)
S  X  of  Commercial Collateral  (10)  S  X  of  Commereial Bank  Debt  (9)  Bank  Debt
MEXICO  S13027  3124  281  S3.465  S1.787  S55252  S18  376  39X
PHILIPPINES  S690  5650  102  S0  SO  S0  5650  10X
COSTA  RICA  - 51144  711  50  522  S22  S1,166  731
VENEZtWE  U1.166  $3.246  17X  SW89  S363  S1.172  S4.418  231
URUGUAY  589  5697  431  557  $14  571  S768  48X
TOTAL  S28972  S18,861  25X  S4,331  S2  16  ,517  25.378  331
Source: World  Debt Tables (1990/91 and 1991/92)  nd Quarterly  Review  of  financial  Flows (various  Issues)
'Eligible  commercial bank debt.
2Fmoe  value of  debt  reduced  by buybacks  and discount bonds.
*Present  value of  debt service reduction an  par bonds  (102 dIscount rate).
"Expected present value of  service  under  recapture clatus.
"Present value of  new  maone  to  be disbursed by comercial  banks.
'Face  value of  principal  collateral.
Sfince the interest  guarantee Is  rolling  and would only be drain  at  sam point  uncertain  in  the  future,  and since interest  on guarantee fund  goes to  the country,  the prepayment  equivalent  of the  interest  guarantee is  less than its  face value. The  prepayment  equivalent of  -. he interest  collateral  is  estimated as its  face value *ultiplied  by the post-operation  stripped  discount  (see Table 3).40
Table 2:  Usage of Enhancements  and Flunchng of Enhancements
(Mions  of dolbers
Financing Sources for  Enhancements Usage  of  Enthanicements
Usage of  Enhancements  Officifa  Debt  CommerciaL  Country
Buyback  Principal  Interest  Total  Additional'  Set Asides 2 New  Mone9  Liquidity 4
MEXICO  S0  S3,465  $3,717  $7,182  S3,732  S1,847  $1.027  $2,423
PHILIPPINES  |670  So  S0  S670  $107  $320  $690  ($127)
COSTA  RICA  $188  S0  $37  $225  $177  S0  S0  $42
VENEZUELA  $647  $809  S924  S2.380  S687  $1,010  S1.166  $527
URUGUAY  $352  $57  $54  $463  S140  $86  $89  S234
TOTAL  $1,857  $4,331  $4,732  $10,920  $4,843  $3,263  $2,972  $3,099
Source:  World  Debt  Tables  (1990/91 and  1991/92)  and  Quarterly  Review  of  Financial  Flows  (various  issues)
'The  face  value  of  the  additional  official  debt  (including  IMF)  disbursed  in  the  context  of  the  deal. 2The  face  value  of  non-additional  existing  official  debt  (includirg  IMF).  We  consider  here  the  IFIs'  set-asides  as  the  only  non-additional  funds. 3The  NPV  of  the  new  moneys  to  be  disbursed  by  coamercial  banks. "The usage  of  the  country's  own  reserves,  including  set-asides.
*  Does  not  add up  due to  a grant  and other  external  financing.41
Table  3: Pde.
Stripped  Prices  Average  Value
to  Creditors
Pre?-  Post 3- (AVC)'
|  Operation  Oeration
"EXICO  0.36  0.52  0.41
|  PHILIPPINES  0.40  0.52  0.46
COSTA  RICA  0.12  0.39  0.24
VENEZUELA  0.37  0.61  0.50
URUGUAY  0.56  0.74  0.60
TOTAL  0.37  0.55  0.44
Source:  Salomon  Brothers  and  Authors'  calculations
'The Average  Value  to Creditors (AVC)  is defined as the post-operation  value of  the new  portfolio.  comprising  post-operation  debt claims (inclusive  of enhancements)  and  payments  applicable  in  connection  with  buybacks  net  of  rnw  money  provided,  as  a  fraction  of  the  face  value  of  the  debt  before  the operation.
2The  pre  operation  price  is  the  average  price  in  the  month  before  the  Brady  plan  was  anncunced  (March  10,  1989). 3The  post operation  price is  the price right  after  the deal has  teen finalized  and  bonds  are exchanged,  expressed  as a stripped price.  The  stripped price is  estimated  as  the  market  value  of  debt  after  the  deal  (as  also  used  for  the  AVC)  minus  the  prepayment  equivalent  of  collaterals  tcolumn  11  in  TabLe  1), divided  by  the  face  value  of  commercial  debt  (column  2  in Table  1)  minus  the  DRE  (coLumn  12  in  Table  2).  See  Lamdany  and  Underwood  (1989)  for  altenative stripping  models.42
Tabe 4: Vahle of Individual Instaments
(Cents  per  doUsr.  unless otherwise noted)
|___________________  |MEXICO  |PHIUPPINES  VENEZUELA  URUGUAY
Par Bond  41.81  NA  49.25  56
Discount Bond  41.03  NA  48.3  NA
Buyback  Price  NA  50  45  56
FLIRBS  NA  NA  49  NA
New  Noney  VaLue  31.25  46.5  53  68.7
Input Prices  for  New  Money:  |  I  _  =
Nlew  Mone  Bonds  A  NA  65  67  68.5
New  Money Bonds  8  NA  NA  63  NA
Conversion Bonds  NA  NA  60  75
Rescheduled  Claims  45  50  NA  NA
New  Money  Call  (fraction)  0.25  0.1  0.2  0.2
Source: Salomon  Brothers,  Anrex Table 1,  and Authors'  calculations43
Table  5:  Financial  Cost  to  the  Country
IMilons  of  dolam)
Other  claims  are  Other  claims  are  equal
_  risktess'  in  seniority 2
MEXICO  $2.189  $8,368
PHILIPPINES  $451  $3,151
COSTA  RICA  $193  $907
VENEZUELA  $2,444  $5,583
URUGUAY  $53  $407
TOTAL  $5,330  $18,416
Source:  Authorst  calculations
Costs  to  the  country  are  the  financial  gains  of  the  commercial  banks,  calculated  as  the  post-operation  market  value  of  the  commercial  bank  debt
portfolio  subtracted  from the  pre-operation  market value of  the  commercial bank debt.
2  The costs as  in  the  first  cotumn  plus  the  additional  costs  to  the  country  as the  result  of  the  financial  gains  of  other  creditors  assuming  that
all  of  them have the  same  seniority  status  as commercial barns.  These financial  gains  of  other  creditors  are  calculate  as  the capital  gains  on
existing  debt  (the  difference  between post-operation  and pre-operation  prices  times  the  face  value  of  other  claims)  and the  financial  loss
associated  with  additional  lending  (using  the  post-operation  stripped  discount).Secondany Market Prices Before Omeratlon  Conduslom ul
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Annex  tabb I  Summwn  of Offically Sumnoeted  Debt  Reducton  Oeamtons
TIIING  EXIT  INSTRUNENTS'  NEW  MN  INSTRIENTS Type  of  Agreement  in  Date  urybecks  Dlscount  Par  New  new  Terms Country  deal  principle  concluded  (percent)  bonds"  bond  monem  on old debt
Mexico 0 Concerted  09/15/89  02/15s/9  65X  - 25X
mturity/grace  maturity/lrace  mturity/grace  aturity/grace
30/29  yr.  30/29  yr.  15/7 yr.  15/7 yr.
int.  t.+13/16X  Int.  6.25X  Int.  L+13/162  Int.  L+13/162
Philippine  Quesi-concerted  08/16189  01/22/90  50  N/A on buybck  mturity/grae  mturi ty/grwe
iS/8 yr  I5/8 yr
Int.  1+13/16X  Int.  L+13/16%
costs Itica  Concerted  11/16/89  05/21/  16  maturity/grace
A: 20/10
B: 25/15
A: Int.  6.25X
B: Int.  6.2SX
Vewnzuel  Concerted  06/25/90  12/17/90  45  70X  maturity/grace  20X  mturity/grce
mturity/grace  30/29  yr.  maturity/grae  17/7  yr.
30/29  yr.  Int.  6.75X  A: 17T/ yr.  Int.  +1.1
B: 15/7  yr.
A: Int.  L1.X
B: Int.  WAS/8
Uruw  Conerted  11/02/90  02/19/91  56  naturity/grace  20X  aturity/grace
30/29  yr.  15/? yr.  16/7  yr.
fint. 6.75X  Int.  L+12  Int.  L 7/8 Notes:
L  denotes  EIBOR.
In additfon to buybacks,  discount  bondsm  and par bonds. there were  the folloing  exit  hstrusents:  for  Costa  Rica, past due Interest bonds  Series A and  S. both with mturity  of  15 years. grace  perlod of nil  years, and interest  rate L + 13/16  percent; for  Venezuela,  front-loaded interest  reduction bonds  with maturity of  17  years. grace  period of  7 years, and  Interest rate  in consecutive  years 5, 5, 6,  6,  7 percent  and L+718  percent thereafter. Exchange  price expressed  as percent  of  fece value of  old debt.  A grace  period of  1 year less than maturity stands  for  a bullet  repsywent. * Enhancemnts:  Mlexico:  full  principal  collateral  and 18 months  of  rolling  Interest guarantee  for  the per and  discount bonds. Costa  Rics: 18 mnths  and  36 months  of
rolling  Interest guarantee  for  the par bond  prices A and  the interest arrears bond  series A, respectively.  Venezuela:  full  principal  cotlateral  and  14  months  of rolling Interest guarantee  for the par and  discount bonds  and 1 months  of rolling  Interest guarantee  (during the first  five years) for  the FULRS  (front-loaded Interest reduction bond.  Urugy:  full  principal  collateral  and 18 months  of  rolling  Interest guarantee  for  the par bond.  For  Venezuels,  two types of  new  money  boids were  avaltable. Additional ehancements  for  these  Instrumnts  include a recapture  clause  based  on oil  prices (Mexico  and  Venezuela).  a commodity  Index (Urugay),  GDP  evolution (Costa Rica).  and a debt equlty swap  window.
*  In the Costa  Rican  agreement,  creditors  tendering  at  least 60 percent  of  their  exposure  for  the buyback  were  offered Series A bonds creditors  offering  tess  than  60 percent of  their  exposure  for  the buyback  had to  convert into  Series B bonds. Pol bond  * past due interest  bond;  creditors  swappf  q into  these bonds  also received a 20 percent  dos  ment.48
A.  TMh  199 Mexioo  Agrenemnt
The  steps  invotved  in  the  Nexico agreement and the  final  outcome  are illustrative  of  what  happened  with  the  other  agreements Cs.e van  Wijrbergen  1991a  for  more details).  Nexico and the  steering  committee of  its  creditor  banks negotiated  for  approximately  4 months, starting  right  after  the  Brady pten  had been anmounced  (March 10.  198).  On  July  23.  1989, after  sLbstantial  potitical  pressures,  an agreement  between Mexico and a committee of  banks was reached on a noen.  The final  agreement was signed on Feb uary 4,  1990.  debt was exchanwed  for  DDSR  bonds on March 28,  1990 and new money  was provided  in  tranches  thereafter.  To avoid  free-riding,  the  agreement included a  novation  clase  (see  footnote  5).
The menu  covered about S48.9 billion  of  medium-term  and long-tern  commercial bank debt,  or  about half  of  Mexico's total  debt,  and included  three  options:  (i)  a discount  bond, a bond with  a discounted principal  of 65 percent,  chosen by 46.7X;  lii)  a par bond, a bond with  a low, fixed  interest  rate  of  6.25  percent.  chosen  by 40.2X; and  (fif)  a  new  money  call.  25  percent  of  existing  exposure  in  total,  chosen  by  13.1X.  The  principal  of  both  bonds  was  guaranteed  through  the  collateralization  of  a  30-year, US Treasury  (or  equivalent)  zero-coupon  bond  and  the  bonds  also  have  a 18  months  interest  payment  guarantee  on  a  rotting  basis  through an escrow  account.2  In  total  an amount  of  $5.6  billion  from  the  World  Bank IMF,  and  Japan.  and  S1.6  billion  from Mexico's own reserves  was used  for  enhancements. B.  The  PhEppises  Agreement
The Philippines  reached agreement in principle  with  its  commrcial  banks in  January 1990 on a "first  phase" DDSR  deal.  In  the  deal  the  Philippines  bought back $1,337  million  of  its  comercial  bank debt  in  an auction  at  a price  of  50 cents.  The deal  also  involved  the  issuance of  S715  mitlion  of  "new money" bonds (with  a spread of  13/16  percent over US-dollar 6-months  LIBOR).  In an attempt to  treat  the new  bonds  as senior, the Philippines promised  not to  request restructurings of  the bonds  at any time and  not to  request any  new  money  loans or other  financial  accommodations  from the holders of  the bonds. The  Philippines received  $427  million  of support from the World  Bank,  the IMF  and  bilateral  donors  and used  $243  million  from its  own  resources  for  the buyback. The  parameters  for  a second  phase  debt reduction agreement  have  been  amounced  recently. C. The  1990 Cota Rica  Agrement
The  Costa  Rica agreement  reached  In May  1990  contained  no new  money  but offered only exit vehicles. Costa  Rica had  accumulated  substantial commercial  arrears since the mid-1980s  which were  included in  the agreement.  The  deal included a buyback  of  debt (with  its  past due interest  iPDIl) at a price  of  16 cents. Banks  that tendered at  least 60 percent of their  claims for  buybacks  could convert the rest of their  exposure  into a bond  with a relatively  short maturity (20 years, 10 grace), and  a rolting interest  guarantee.  Banks  that  sold  less than 60 percent of  their  exposure  received a less valuable bond against their  remaining  exposure  (25 years,  15 grace, no guarantees).  Finally,  the PFI that was  not tendered  for  buyback  was  partly  paid up front  (20 percent) and partly  rescheduled.25 The  buyback  retired  61.5 percent of  the outstanding  debt. Together  with the interest  support and the down  payment  of  the PDI, the cost of  the deal amounted  to $225.5  million."  The  deal did not  involve the use of World  Bank  and iNF furnds,  but was  financed with bilateral  grants and  loans and own  reserves  ($42 million). D. The  1990 Venezuela  Agmernent
In December  1990,  Venezuela  reached  an agreement  with its  creditors  on a Brady  deal comprising  new  money,  exchange  bonds  and  a buyback  (at  a 55 percent  discount). The  new  money  call  was  set at  20 percent, spread  over 4 years. $1.15 billion  was  raised in new  money  with the old debt converted  into  uncoltateratized conversion  bonds (17 years, 7 grace, Libor +  7/81). Only 7.3 percent of  the debt was  tendered  for  the buyback. There  were  three exchange  bonds: a par bond (fixed  interest  at  6.75 percent, 30 years bullet  maturity,  principal  defeased  and 14 month  of  rolling  interest guarantee); a discount bond  (exchanged  at 30 percent discount, Libor+13/16X,  30 years  bullet  maturity,  same  enhancements  as the par bond); and a "front  loaded  interest reduction  bond"  (FLIRB)  (starting  at 5 percent interest  and rising  over time, 17 years  maturity, 7 grace, 12 month  of rolling  interest guarantee  for  the first  5 years).27
The  cost of the deal was  about  $2.4  billion,  financed  by the IMF, the World  Bank,  and  the Japanese  Exim  Bank  (altogether about  $1.7 billion),  and  from  Venezuela's own  reserves.
E. The  1990 Uwguay  Agreament
Reached  in November  1990,  the agreement  contains a buyback  at a 4  percent  discount, a par bond  (30 years maturity, principal  collateralized  and  18  month  of rolling interest guarantee,  6.75  percent interest)  and  a new  money  call  set at 20 percent.  At the January  1991  exchange,  39 percent  of the debt was  tendered  for buyback,  33 percent exchanged  against the par bond,  and 28 percent  was  restructured and  provided  new  money.  The  cost of  the deal amounted  to $463  million  which  was  funded  from  the country's reserves  and  multilateral  sources  (IMF, the World  Bank  and IDB), and by the new  money  from conmercial  banks.
'Both bonds  are  not sultaect  to  the sharing  clauses  which  are standard  in most  syndicated  loan agreements.  In addition,  both  bonds  include  a recapture  clause which stipulates  that, in case the oil-price  increased  by a certain percentage  in the years 1997  and beyond, that the creditors  share in the increased  revenue
stream. The agreement  fwther specified  a certain  number  of relending  options,  in which banks are allowed  to relend, up to a certain maximum  fraction,  their
claims  to Mexican  public  companies,  and a debt-for-equity  swap  program.
lThere also was a recapwture  clause (with  a cap) on both the bonds  and the PDI rescheduling,  based  on real GDP growth, and debt for equity conversion rights for the bonds.
'Ony 4 prent  of creditors  free  rode.
I'1M th  bonds  also include  delachable  warrwnt  for an upside  value recovery  tied to the real price of oil.Policy  Research Wortflrj  Paper Series
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